Skip to content
Register Sign in Wishlist
Competition Policy

Competition Policy
A Game-Theoretic Perspective

$35.99 (C)

  • Author: Louis Phlips, European University Institute, Florence
  • Date Published: October 1995
  • availability: Available
  • format: Paperback
  • isbn: 9780521498715

$ 35.99 (C)

Add to cart Add to wishlist

Other available formats:

Looking for an examination copy?

If you are interested in the title for your course we can consider offering an examination copy. To register your interest please contact providing details of the course you are teaching.

Product filter button
About the Authors
  • This book uses game theory to analyze anti-competitive behavior among firms and to consider its implications for competition policy. Topics include "explicit collusion," "tacit collusion," "semicollusion," and the detection of predatory pricing. The book discusses several European antitrust decisions and empirical studies in detail.

    • An entirely up-to-date book, which uses the most modern economic techniques to analyse anti-competition behaviour & competition policy
    • Offers a combination of the latest theory and empirical studies
    • The latest book from Louis Phlips, the president of the European Economic Association for 1995, and a highly successful and well-known Cambridge author
    Read more

    Customer reviews

    Not yet reviewed

    Be the first to review

    Review was not posted due to profanity


    , create a review

    (If you're not , sign out)

    Please enter the right captcha value
    Please enter a star rating.
    Your review must be a minimum of 12 words.

    How do you rate this item?


    Product details

    • Date Published: October 1995
    • format: Paperback
    • isbn: 9780521498715
    • length: 292 pages
    • dimensions: 234 x 156 x 16 mm
    • weight: 0.41kg
    • contains: 28 line figures
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    1. Preliminaries
    Part I. Explicit Collusion:
    2. Four are few and six are many
    3. Cartel laws are good for business
    4. Cartel enforcement
    Part II. Tacit Collusion:
    5. Information sharing among oligopolists
    6. Repeated games with collusive outcomes
    7. Price leadership and conscious parallelism
    8. Collusion detection
    Part III. Semicollusion:
    9. Excess capacity and collusion
    10. Collusion in R & D
    Part IV. Predatory Pricing:
    11. Predation in theory
    12. Evidence on predation
    13. Antitrust implications.

  • Author

    Louis Phlips, European University Institute, Florence

Sign In

Please sign in to access your account


Not already registered? Create an account now. ×

Sorry, this resource is locked

Please register or sign in to request access. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email

Register Sign in
Please note that this file is password protected. You will be asked to input your password on the next screen.

» Proceed

You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website. Your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner Please see the permission section of the catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.

Continue ×

Continue ×

Continue ×

Find content that relates to you

Join us online

This site uses cookies to improve your experience. Read more Close

Are you sure you want to delete your account?

This cannot be undone.


Thank you for your feedback which will help us improve our service.

If you requested a response, we will make sure to get back to you shortly.

Please fill in the required fields in your feedback submission.