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Look Inside Incentives

Incentives
Motivation and the Economics of Information

3rd Edition

$54.99 (X)

textbook
  • Date Published: February 2018
  • availability: In stock
  • format: Paperback
  • isbn: 9781107610330

$ 54.99 (X)
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  • When incentives work well, individuals prosper. When incentives are poor, the pursuit of self-interest is self-defeating. This book is wholly devoted to the topical subject of incentives from individual, collective, and institutional standpoints. This third edition is fully updated and expanded, including a new section on the 2007–08 financial crisis and a new chapter on networks as well as specific applications of school placement for students, search engine ad auctions, pollution permits, and more. Using worked examples and lucid general theory in its analysis, and seasoned with references to current and past events, Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of Information examines: the performance of agents hired to carry out specific tasks, from taxi drivers to CEOs; the performance of institutions, from voting schemes to medical panels deciding who gets kidney transplants; a wide range of market transactions, from auctions to labor markets to the entire economy. Suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate students studying incentives as part of courses in microeconomics, economic theory, managerial economics, political economy, and related areas of social science.

    • Includes many diagrams and worked exampled for students who struggle with the sophisticated notions of equilibrium
    • Theory and examples of abstract models are presented rigorously, yet accessibly
    • Covers a wide range of topics appropriate for both the undergraduate and graduate level
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    Product details

    • Edition: 3rd Edition
    • Date Published: February 2018
    • format: Paperback
    • isbn: 9781107610330
    • length: 694 pages
    • dimensions: 252 x 176 x 30 mm
    • weight: 1.42kg
    • contains: 55 b/w illus.
    • availability: In stock
  • Table of Contents

    1. Equilibrium, efficiency, and asymmetric information
    2. Basic models and tools
    3. Hidden action
    4. Corporate governance
    5. Hidden characteristics
    6. Auctions
    7. Voting and preference revelation
    8. Public goods and preference revelation
    9. Matching
    10. Networks
    11. General competitive equilibrium.

  • Author

    Donald E. Campbell, College of William and Mary, Virginia
    Donald E. Campbell is the CSX Professor of Economics at the College of William and Mary, Virginia. Campbell received a B.A. from Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario and his doctorate from Princeton University, New Jersey, and previously taught at the University of Toronto for twenty years. He specializes in mechanism design and social choice theory and teaches advanced courses on incentives and information. He has written three books and over 100 articles in leading journals.

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