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Constitutions in Times of Financial Crisis

$110.00 (C)

Part of Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy

Tom Ginsburg, Mark Rosen, Georg Vanberg, John Ferejohn, Eric A. Posner, Barry Cushman, Mitu Gulati, Daniel Kelemen, Eva Brems, Turkuler Isiksel, Federico Fabbrini, Teresa Violante, Patrícia André, Xenophon Contiades, Alkmene Fotiadou, Gabriel L. Negretto, Björn Dressel
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  • Publication planned for: August 2019
  • availability: Not yet published - available from July 2019
  • format: Hardback
  • isbn: 9781108492294

$ 110.00 (C)
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About the Authors
  • Many constitutions include provisions intended to limit the discretion of governments in economic policy. In times of financial crises, such provisions often come under pressure as a result of calls for exceptional responses to crisis situations. This volume assesses the ability of constitutional orders all over the world to cope with financial crises, and the demands for emergency powers that typically accompany them. Bringing together a variety of perspectives from legal scholars, economists, and political scientists, this volume traces the long-run implications of financial crises for constitutional order. In exploring the theoretical and practical problems raised by the constitutionalization of economic policy during times of severe crisis, this volume showcases an array of constitutional design options and the ways they channel governmental responses to emergency.

    • Offers the first volume on financial emergencies and constitutions
    • Takes a multi-jurisdictional and historical approach
    • Analyzes reciprocal causality
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    Product details

    • Publication planned for: August 2019
    • format: Hardback
    • isbn: 9781108492294
    • length: 340 pages
    • dimensions: 235 x 156 x 22 mm
    • weight: 0.62kg
    • availability: Not yet published - available from July 2019
  • Table of Contents

    1. Introduction Tom Ginsburg, Mark Rosen and Georg Vanberg
    Part I. The Role of Constitutions in Dealing with Crises:
    2. Financial emergencies John Ferejohn
    3. Rule-of-law objections to the lender of last resort Eric A. Posner
    4. Balanced budget provisions in constitutions Tom Ginsburg
    5. Legislatures and constitutions in times of severe financial crisis Mark D. Rosen
    Part II. Courts and Crises:
    6. The place of economic crisis in American constitutional law: the Great Depression as a case study Barry Cushman
    7. Financial crises and constitutional compromise Georg Vanberg and Mitu Gulati
    8. Commitment for cowards: why the judicialization of austerity is bad policy and even worse politics Daniel Kelemen
    9. Protecting fundamental rights during financial crisis: supranational adjudication in the Council of Europe Eva Brems
    Part III. Supranational Governance and Crisis:
    10. Constitutionalism as limitation and license: crisis governance in the European Union Turkuler Isiksel
    11. The institutional origin of Europe's constitutional crises: Grexit, Brexit and the EU form of government Federico Fabbrini
    Part IV. Implementing Austerity:
    12. The constitutional performance of austerity in Portugal Teresa Violante and Patrícia André
    13. Constitutional resilience and constitutional failure in the face of crisis: the Greek case Xenophon Contiades and Alkmene Fotiadou
    Part V. The Effect of Crises on Constitutions:
    14. Economic crises economic crises, political fragmentation, and constitutional choice: the agenda-setting power of presidents in Latin America Gabriel L. Negretto
    15. Constitutions, crisis, and regime change: perspectives on East and Southeast Asia Björn Dressel.

  • Editors

    Tom Ginsburg, University of Chicago
    Tom Ginsburg is Leo Spitz Professor of International Law and Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago Law School.

    Mark D. Rosen, Illinois Institute of Technology
    Mark D. Rosen is University Distinguished Professor at Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology.

    Georg Vanberg, Duke University, North Carolina
    Georg Vanberg is Professor of Political Science and Law, and current Chair of the Department of Political Science at Duke University, North Carolina.

    Contributors

    Tom Ginsburg, Mark Rosen, Georg Vanberg, John Ferejohn, Eric A. Posner, Barry Cushman, Mitu Gulati, Daniel Kelemen, Eva Brems, Turkuler Isiksel, Federico Fabbrini, Teresa Violante, Patrícia André, Xenophon Contiades, Alkmene Fotiadou, Gabriel L. Negretto, Björn Dressel

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