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Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation

$40.99 (P)

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  • Date Published: May 2005
  • availability: Available
  • format: Paperback
  • isbn: 9780521008839

$ 40.99 (P)

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About the Authors
  • Honesty in voting is not always the best policy. This is a book for mathematicians, political scientists, economists and philosophers who want to understand how it is impossible to devise a reasonable voting system in which voters can never gain by submitting a disingenuous ballot. The book requires no prerequisites except a willingness to follow rigorous mathematical arguments.

    • This is the only book that tries to bring together the main results from the last quarter of the twentieth century that deal with the manipulability of voting systems
    • This is a unified treatment; a vast majority of the proofs are new
    • This is a self-contained treatment; there are no prerequisites except a willingness to follow mathematical arguments
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    Reviews & endorsements

    "...until recently there has been a problem facing mathematicians who are interested in learning about [the mathematics of elections]...I am pleased to say that this is no longer the case, as Alan D. Taylor's recently released Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation fits this bill perfectly."
    MAA Reviews, Darren Glass

    "[T]his book is a little gem. It will be especially prized by those who need to understand voting systems and how they can be manipulated by individual voters."
    Mathematics Today

    "Taylor's book gives an excellent overview of many results stemming from Gibbard's and Satterthwaite's original analysis...The general organization of the book is excellent. This is truly a wonderful book and it can be recommended to mathematicians looking for applications in the social sciences" - Marice Salles

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    Product details

    • Date Published: May 2005
    • format: Paperback
    • isbn: 9780521008839
    • length: 190 pages
    • copublisher: The Mathematical Association of America
    • dimensions: 229 x 153 x 17 mm
    • weight: 0.272kg
    • contains: 3 b/w illus. 80 exercises
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    1. Introduction
    2. The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem
    3. Additional results for single-valued elections
    4. The Duggan–Schwartz theorem
    5. Additional results for multi-valued elections
    6. Ballots that rank sets
    7. Elections with outcomes that are lotteries
    8. Elections with variable agendas

  • Instructors have used or reviewed this title for the following courses

    • Mathematics: Prediction, Persuasion and Politics
  • Author

    Alan D. Taylor, Union College, New York

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