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Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
Inference, Testimony and Memory

$99.99 (C)

  • Publication planned for: September 2019
  • availability: Not yet published - available from September 2019
  • format: Hardback
  • isbn: 9781108491914

$ 99.99 (C)

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About the Authors
  • According to the received view in epistemology, inferential knowledge from non-knowledge is impossible - that is, in order for a subject to know the conclusion of their inference, they must know the essential premises from which that conclusion is drawn. In this book, Federico Luzzi critically examines this view, arguing that it is less plausible than intuition suggests and that it can be abandoned without substantial cost. In a discussion that ranges across inference, testimony and memory he analyses the full range of challenges to the view, connecting them to epistemological cases that support those challenges. He then proposes a defeater-based framework which allows the phenomenon of knowledge from non-knowledge across these three epistemic areas to be better understood. His book will be of interest to a wide range of readers in epistemology.

    • Presents arguments against the idea that knowledge of a conclusion requires knowledge of essential premises
    • Provides the first comprehensive and systematic introduction to the concept of knowledge from non-knowledge
    • Contains state-of-the-art discussions of three key topics in epistemology: inference, testimony and memory
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    Product details

    • Publication planned for: September 2019
    • format: Hardback
    • isbn: 9781108491914
    • length: 210 pages
    • dimensions: 234 x 157 x 15 mm
    • weight: 0.43kg
    • availability: Not yet published - available from September 2019
  • Table of Contents

    1. Knowledge from knowledge
    1.1 The default view
    1.2 Knowledge counter-closure
    1.3 A schema for KCC failures
    2. Inferential knowledge from falsehood
    2.1 Introduction
    2.2 Warfield on inferential knowledge from falsehood
    2.3 Warfield against the 'proxy-premise' strategy
    2.4 Montminy's defense of the proxy premise strategy and his attack on KFF
    2.5 Responding to Montminy's Challenge
    2.6. Against the proxy premise strategy
    2.7. Schnee on KFF
    2.8 Accounts of knowledge from falsehood
    2.9 Conclusion
    3. Inferential Knowledge from Unknown Truth:
    3.1. Introduction
    3.2. KCC and Modal Conditions on Knowledge
    3.3. Agoraphobia
    3.4 The breadth of the challenge
    3.5 DeRose's attributor contextualism
    3.6 Birthday
    3.7 Stanley's interest-relative invariantism
    3.8 Coral
    3.9 Knowledge from essential falsehood?
    3.10 Conclusion
    4. How to abandon knowledge counter-closure
    4.1 Introduction
    4.2 Epistemic 'hocus-pocus'?
    4.3 Replacing KCC
    4.4 Murphy on justification and belief
    4.5 Denying KCC: costs?
    4.6 Multi-premise inference
    4.7 Conclusion
    5. Testimony and knowledge from non-knowledge:
    5.1 Introduction
    5.2 Testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge
    5.3 Testimony and inference: a defeater asymmetry
    5.4 Second-hand knowledge
    5.5. Safety-based testimonial knowledge from non-knowledge
    5.6 Conclusion
    6. Memory and knowledge from non-knowledge
    6.1 Introduction
    6.2 Lackey's cases against KPS
    6.3 Señor's objections
    6.4 Factual-defeater-based case
    7. Knowledge from non-knowledge in inference, testimony and memory:
    7.1 Inference, testimony and memory
    7.2 Conclusion.

  • Author

    Federico Luzzi, University of Aberdeen
    Federico Luzzi is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen.

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