Looking for an examination copy?
If you are interested in the title for your course we can consider offering an examination copy. To register your interest please contact email@example.com providing details of the course you are teaching.
Some of a person's mental states have the power to represent real and imagined states of affairs: they have semantic properties. What Minds Can Do has two goals: to find a naturalistic or nonsemantic basis for the representational powers of a person's mind, and to show that these semantic properties are involved in the causal explanation of the person's behavior. In the process, the book addresses issues that are central to much contemporary philosophical debate. It will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of mind and of language, cognitive science, and psychology.Read more
- Extended and accessible discussions of topics widely studied in philosophy of mind courses and seminars
- Looks at the work of many other writers in the area, such as Fodor, Davidson, Quine
- Of interest not only to philosophers but also to psychologists and cognitive scientists
Reviews & endorsements
"This is a very scholarly work." Michael Luntley, Philosophy in Review
Not yet reviewed
Be the first to review
Review was not posted due to profanity×
- Date Published: February 1997
- format: Paperback
- isbn: 9780521574365
- length: 312 pages
- dimensions: 216 x 140 x 17 mm
- weight: 0.375kg
- availability: Available
Table of Contents
Part I. The Naturalization of Intentionality:
1. What is intentional realism?
2. Introduction to informational semantics
3. Three problems for informational semantics
4. Information and teleology
Part II. The Casual Role of Intentionality:
5. The computational representational theory of mind (CRTM)
6. Must an intentional realist be a meaning atomist?
7. Functionalism and the threat of pre-emption
8. Explaining intentional behaviour
9. Conclusion: a postlude on semantics and psychology
Sorry, this resource is locked
Please register or sign in to request access. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email firstname.lastname@example.orgRegister Sign in
You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website. Your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner www.ebooks.com. Please see the permission section of the www.ebooks.com catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.Continue ×