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Environmental Dilemmas and Policy Design

Environmental Dilemmas and Policy Design

$39.99 (C)

Part of Theories of Institutional Design

  • Date Published: September 2002
  • availability: Available
  • format: Paperback
  • isbn: 9780521627641

$ 39.99 (C)
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About the Authors
  • This book examines environmental policy-making through research into individuals' reaction to environmental issues. It is often assumed that people are reluctant to contribute to environmental protection, because they do not see it as in their interests. The authors argue that self-interest is just one of a number of motives which affect people's choices, and that voluntary environmental polices are thus more likely to succeed than might be expected. They base their arguments on detailed surveys of public opinion.

    • Detailed survey-based study of people's attitudes to environmental protection and cooperation in collective action, and the tension between self-interest and moral commitment in social dilemmas
    • Empirical application of rational choice theory
    • Assessment of the viability of non-coercive environmental regulation
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    Reviews & endorsements

    "This is social science at its best. Instead of taking casual looks at very important concepts, they have teased apart an important foundation of modern social science theory, and developed a large data set that enables them to examine piece by piece this important concept. What a gem!" Elinor Ostrom, Indiana University

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    Product details

    • Date Published: September 2002
    • format: Paperback
    • isbn: 9780521627641
    • length: 262 pages
    • dimensions: 229 x 152 x 15 mm
    • weight: 0.41kg
    • contains: 25 b/w illus. 28 tables
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    Preface
    Part I. Background:
    1. Environmental pollution as a problem of collective action
    1.1. Can something be done?
    1.2. Environmental dilemmas and the logic of collective action
    1.3. Surveying environmental dilemmas from the actor's perspective: rational choice
    1.4. How motives speak to preferences
    1.5. Non-equivalent dilemmas and reported behaviour
    1.6. Policies of self regulation in the Netherlands
    1.7. Moral commitment in environmental dilemmas: conditional or unconditional?
    1.8. Determinants of cooperation in environmental dilemmas and policy design
    2. A Dutch approach: self regulation as a policy concept
    2.1. Introduction
    2.2. Dutch environmental policy and the idea of self regulation
    2.3. The social instruments
    2.4. An environmental ethos and the social dilemma
    2.5. Self regulation: compliance-oriented or virtue-based?
    3. The actor's perspective on collective action
    3.1. The subjectivity of the actor in rational choice theory
    3.2. Problems of collective action
    3.3. Social dilemmas
    3.4. The actor's perspective
    Part II. The Survey:
    4. Preference orderings and measurement
    4.1. Three potential social dilemmas
    4.2. Measuring preference orderings
    4.3. Three different environmental problems
    4.4. Avoiding response effects
    5. Rational choice
    5.1. Conditions of rational choice
    5.2. The dominance rule of rational choice
    5.3. Choice of strategy
    5.4. The robustness of the dominance rule
    5.5. Conclusion
    6. Consistency of motives and preferences
    6.1. A model of reasoned choice
    6.2. The motives of Valuation and Willingness
    6.3. The test of consistent preferences
    6.4. Consistent preferences in the three cases
    6.5. Does motive-preference consistency matter?
    6.6. Conclusion
    7. The non-equivalence of the cases
    7.1. Hard and easy cases of the dilemma
    7.2. The model of the hardest case
    7.3. The scalability of the cases
    7.4. Conclusion
    8. Reported behaviour
    8.1. Determinants of behaviour
    8.2. The sociocultural model
    8.3. An alternative model
    8.4. From motives to behaviour
    Part III. Conclusions: Theory and Policy:
    9. Do people accept self regulation policy?
    9.1. Introduction to Part III
    9.2. Acceptance and agreement
    9.3. The acceptance of legal regulation and self regulation
    9.4. Conclusion
    10. Do people agree with the environmental ethos?
    10.1. Introduction
    10.2. The two stages of the environmental ethos
    10.3. Knaves, pawns or knights?
    10.4. The ethical interpretation of motives and preferences
    10.5. The agreement response
    10.6. Acceptance and agreement: overview
    11. Moral commitment and rational cooperation
    11.1. Ranking preference orderings
    11.2. The meta-ranking approach
    11.3. Enlightened self-interest and moral commitment
    11.4. Consistent preferences in the meta-ranking
    11.5. An environmental meta-ranking
    12. Reciprocity and cooperation in environmental dilemmas
    12.1. The puzzle of unconditional cooperation
    12.2. The reciprocity thesis
    12.3. Cost of cooperation and conditionalities in environmental dilemmas
    13. Assessing self regulation policies
    13.1. The context of environmental dilemmas
    13.2. Consistent ethical cooperation
    13.3. Background features of hard and easy cases
    13.4. Mapping problems and the salience of the environmental ethos
    13.5. Individual cost and collective gain
    13.6. Comparing motives in the polar cases
    13.7. The dimension of private significance
    13.8. Self regulation policy: symbolic or real?
    13.9. A non-moralistic approach to environmental responsibility
    13.10. Self regulation in proportion to facilitation
    Bibliography
    Index.

  • Authors

    Huib Pellikaan, Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, The Netherlands
    Dr Huib Pellikaan is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Leiden University. He is currently the managing editor of Acta Politica, the journal of the Dutch Association for the Science of Politics.

    Robert J. van der Veen, Universiteit van Amsterdam
    Robert van der Veen is a lecturer in Political Theory in the Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam. He is the author of Between Exploitation and Communism (1991), as well as the editor of Basic Income on the Agenda (with Loek Groot, 2000). He has contributed articles to many journals including Economics and Philosophy, The British Journal of Political Science, The Journal of Political Philosophy and Acta Politica.

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