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Look Inside The Politics of Quasi-Government

The Politics of Quasi-Government
Hybrid Organizations and the Dynamics of Bureaucratic Control

$52.99 (C)

Part of Theories of Institutional Design

  • Date Published: November 2006
  • availability: Available
  • format: Paperback
  • isbn: 9780521525602

$ 52.99 (C)

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About the Authors
  • Promising increased efficiency and superior service, the quasi-government has grown as governmental functions have been delegated to new entities combining characteristics of public- and private-sector organizations. Jonathan Koppell argues that control of public policy is sacrificed when public policy is carried out by such hybrid organizations. Although they may be designed to limit the loss of public control, Koppell suggests that quasi-government should be limited to tasks that are not of critical importance to policy-makers.

    • Examines and explains the political dynamics of quasi-government, an area that is generally overlooked in both academic and popular literature on government and public policy.
    • The first systematic comparison of hybrid organizations and traditional government agencies.
    • Offers a rich conception of the bureaucratic control problem – a key issue in the literature of public administration
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    Reviews & endorsements

    "Koppell's study of the quasi-governmental organizations brings a novel and needed perspective to the problem of bureaucratic control--one central to political science and administration. Comparing hybrid organizations such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with traditional government agencies, he highlights the importance of specific aspects of organizational structure that allow elected officials to control bureaucracies. This work provides important ground work for further study of the proliferating range of public-private organizational arrangements." Todd R. La Porte, University of California, Berkeley

    "The book contains an impressive analysis of current and classic literature and includes extensive background information on the agencies. Highly recommended." Choice

    "A welcome addition to the growing literature on the government's increasing delegation of public responsibilities to organizations outside of the formal government structure." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

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    Product details

    • Date Published: November 2006
    • format: Paperback
    • isbn: 9780521525602
    • length: 256 pages
    • dimensions: 229 x 152 x 15 mm
    • weight: 0.38kg
    • contains: 4 b/w illus. 14 tables
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    List of figures
    List of tables
    List of acronyms
    1. Introduction
    2. Building a better model of bureaucratic control
    3. Administration by regulation
    4. Principal's preference, organizational structure and the likelihood of control
    5. Hybrid organizations and the alignment of interests
    6. The limits of congressional control: agent structure as constraint
    7. Regulating hybrids: structure and control
    8. Conclusion
    Appendix: background of organizations studied
    Interview subjects

  • Author

    Jonathan G. S. Koppell, Yale University, Connecticut
    Jonathan G. S. Koppell is Assistant Professor of Politics, Policy and Organization at the Yale School of Management, Yale University.

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