Skip to content
Register Sign in Wishlist

Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory

$29.00 USD

  • Date Published: January 2005
  • availability: This ISBN is for an eBook version which is distributed on our behalf by a third party.
  • format: Adobe eBook Reader
  • isbn: 9780511031441

$ 29.00 USD
Adobe eBook Reader

You will be taken to for this purchase
Buy eBook Add to wishlist

Other available formats:
Hardback, Paperback

Looking for an inspection copy?

This title is not currently available on inspection

Product filter button
About the Authors
  • Wulf Gaertner provides a comprehensive account of an important and complex issue within social choice theory: how to establish a social welfare function while restricting the spectrum of individual preferences in a sensible way. Gaertner's starting point is K. J. Arrow's famous 'Impossibility Theorem', which showed that no welfare function could exist if an unrestricted domain of preferences is to be satisfied together with some other appealing conditions. A number of leading economists have tried to provide avenues out of this 'impossibility' by restricting the variety of preferences: here, Gaertner provides a clear and detailed account, using standardized mathematical notation, of well over forty theorems associated with domain conditions. Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory will be an essential addition to the library of social choice theory for scholars and their advanced graduate students.

    • A most comprehensive survey of literature, covering over 100 theorems
    • Uses standardized mathematical notation
    • Work quoted by Amartya Sen in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech
    Read more

    Reviews & endorsements

    'The domain conditions in social choice theory have a history of about half a century, going back to the classic paper of Duncan Black published in 1948. Over this period, a large number of writers have explored various aspects of the subject. Gaertner's survey provides an exceptionally lucid and comprehensive account of this diverse literature. Gaertner's exposition brings out the major intuitive themes in a very clear fashion, while paying meticulous attention to the technical details of individual results. Readers in search of an introduction to the literature, as well as researchers looking for an authoritative book of reference on the subject, should find the book very helpful.' Prasanta K. Pattanaik, University of California, Riverside

    'Wulf Gaertner's monograph surveys the wide-ranging literature on domain restrictions in social choice theory. In a field where impossibility theorems abound, it is a refreshing change to see Gaertner's focus on what is possible if there are limits to the heterogeneity of individual preferences. Specialists will find this volume to be a handy compendium of what is known about the subject. By eschewing proofs, Gaertner has also made a rather technical subject accessible to the non-specialist.' John A. Weymark, Vanderbilt University

    'The author had to encompass a very large number of results, coming from very diverse sources, and using a wide variety of techniques. He has managed to do this beautifully.' Journal of Economics

    '… a perfect guide for any researcher who needs to know more about the preferences restriction in social choice theory … Although this field is considered as a difficult area in social choice theory, Gaertner made a wonderful job at presenting and illustrating the main results …' Social Choice and Welfare

    'Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory is an interesting and valuable book. It will be an essential addition to the library of social choice theory scholars and their graduate students. The most relevant results and theorems on the subject are included an proofs are easy to follow. This well-written monograph will be an excellent reference for researchers interested in domain restrictions in social choice theory.' Public Choice

    See more reviews

    Customer reviews

    Not yet reviewed

    Be the first to review

    Review was not posted due to profanity


    , create a review

    (If you're not , sign out)

    Please enter the right captcha value
    Please enter a star rating.
    Your review must be a minimum of 12 words.

    How do you rate this item?


    Product details

    • Date Published: January 2005
    • format: Adobe eBook Reader
    • isbn: 9780511031441
    • contains: 6 b/w illus.
    • availability: This ISBN is for an eBook version which is distributed on our behalf by a third party.
  • Table of Contents

    Preface and acknowledgements
    1. Introduction
    2. Notation, definitions and two fundamental theorems
    3. The existence of collective choice rules under exclusion conditions for finite sets of discrete alternatives
    4. Arrovian social welfare functions, nonmanipulable voting procedures and stable group decision functions
    5. Restrictions on the distribution of individuals' preferences
    6. The existence of social choice rules in n-dimensional continuous space
    7. Concluding remarks
    8. References

  • Author

    Wulf Gaertner, Universität Osnabrück
    WULF GAERTNER is Professor of Economics at the University of Osnabrück. He has been a Visiting Scholar at Harvard University and at the London School of Economics and Political Science and has published extensively on social choice theory in leading journals. He is one of the managing editors of the journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Sign In

Please sign in to access your account


Not already registered? Create an account now. ×

Sorry, this resource is locked

Please register or sign in to request access. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email

Register Sign in
Please note that this file is password protected. You will be asked to input your password on the next screen.

» Proceed

You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website. Your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner Please see the permission section of the catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.

Continue ×

Continue ×

Continue ×

Find content that relates to you

Join us online

This site uses cookies to improve your experience. Read more Close

Are you sure you want to delete your account?

This cannot be undone.


Thank you for your feedback which will help us improve our service.

If you requested a response, we will make sure to get back to you shortly.

Please fill in the required fields in your feedback submission.