Skip to content
Register Sign in Wishlist

Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining

£37.99

Alvin E. Roth, Kalyan Chatterjee, Robert Wilson, Robert W. Rosenthal, Drew Fudenberg, David Levine, Jean Tirole, Ariel Rubinstein, Roger B. Myerson, Peter C. Cramton, Martin J. Osborne, Stef Tijs, Hans Peters, William Thomson, K. G. Binmore, Sergiu Hart, William Samuelson, Joel Sobel, Vincent P. Crawford
View all contributors
  • Date Published: November 2005
  • availability: Available
  • format: Paperback
  • isbn: 9780521022743

£ 37.99
Paperback

Add to cart Add to wishlist

Other available formats:
Hardback, eBook


Looking for an inspection copy?

This title is not currently available on inspection

Description
Product filter button
Description
Contents
Resources
Courses
About the Authors
  • Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games.

    Customer reviews

    Not yet reviewed

    Be the first to review

    Review was not posted due to profanity

    ×

    , create a review

    (If you're not , sign out)

    Please enter the right captcha value
    Please enter a star rating.
    Your review must be a minimum of 12 words.

    How do you rate this item?

    ×

    Product details

    • Date Published: November 2005
    • format: Paperback
    • isbn: 9780521022743
    • length: 404 pages
    • dimensions: 228 x 153 x 22 mm
    • weight: 0.591kg
    • contains: 54 b/w illus. 6 tables
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    Preface
    1. Editor's introduction and overview Alvin E. Roth
    2. Disagreement in bargaining: models with incomplete information Kalyan Chatterjee
    3. Reputations in games and markets Robert Wilson
    4. An approach to some noncooperative game situations with special attention to bargaining Robert W. Rosenthal
    5. Infinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information Drew Fudenberg, David Levine and Jean Tirole
    6. Choice of conjectures in a bargaining game with incomplete information Ariel Rubinstein
    7. Analysis of two bargaining problems with incomplete information Roger B. Myerson
    8. Sequential bargaining mechanisms Peter C. Cramton
    9. The role of risk aversion in a simple bargaining model Martin J. Osborne
    10. Risk sensitivity and related properties for bargaining solutions Stef Tijs and Hans Peters
    11. Axiomatic theory of bargaining with a variable population: a survey of recent results William Thomson
    12. Toward a focal-point theory of bargaining Alvin E. Roth
    13. Bargaining and coalitions K. G. Binmore
    14. Axiomatic approaches to coalitional bargaining Sergiu Hart
    15. A comment on the Coase theorem William Samuelson
    16. Disclosure of evidence and resolution of disputes: who should bear the burden of proof? Joel Sobel
    17. The role of arbitration and the theory of incentives Vincent P. Crawford.

  • Editor

    Alvin E. Roth, University of Pittsburgh

    Contributors

    Alvin E. Roth, Kalyan Chatterjee, Robert Wilson, Robert W. Rosenthal, Drew Fudenberg, David Levine, Jean Tirole, Ariel Rubinstein, Roger B. Myerson, Peter C. Cramton, Martin J. Osborne, Stef Tijs, Hans Peters, William Thomson, K. G. Binmore, Sergiu Hart, William Samuelson, Joel Sobel, Vincent P. Crawford

Sign In

Please sign in to access your account

Cancel

Not already registered? Create an account now. ×

Sorry, this resource is locked

Please register or sign in to request access. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email lecturers@cambridge.org

Register Sign in
Please note that this file is password protected. You will be asked to input your password on the next screen.

» Proceed

You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website. Your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner www.ebooks.com. Please see the permission section of the www.ebooks.com catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.

Continue ×

Continue ×

Continue ×

Find content that relates to you

Join us online

This site uses cookies to improve your experience. Read more Close

Are you sure you want to delete your account?

This cannot be undone.

Cancel

Thank you for your feedback which will help us improve our service.

If you requested a response, we will make sure to get back to you shortly.

×
Please fill in the required fields in your feedback submission.
×