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Motivation and the Economics of Information

2nd Edition

$48.00 USD

  • Date Published: June 2006
  • availability: This ISBN is for an eBook version which is distributed on our behalf by a third party.
  • format: Adobe eBook Reader
  • isbn: 9780511217562

$ 48.00 USD
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About the Authors
  • This book, first published in 2006, examines the incentives at work in a wide range of institutions to see how and how well coordination is achieved by informing and motivating individual decision makers. The book examines the performance of agents hired to carry out specific tasks, from taxi drivers to CEOs. It investigates the performance of institutions, from voting schemes to kidney transplants, to see if they enhance general well being. The book examines a broad range of market transactions, from auctions to labor markets, to the entire economy. The analysis is conducted using specific worked examples, lucid general theory, and illustrations drawn from news stories. Of the seventy different topics and sections, only twelve require a knowledge of calculus. The second edition offers new chapters on auctions, matching and assignment problems, and corporate governance. Boxed examples are used to highlight points of theory and are separated from the main text.

    • New edition offers 3 new chapters on auctions, matching and assignment problems, and corporate governance
    • Treatment carefully links theory, worked out examples, and illustrations from news stories
    • There is a wide range of topics explained from first principles arranged in a modular fashion
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    Product details

    • Edition: 2nd Edition
    • Date Published: June 2006
    • format: Adobe eBook Reader
    • isbn: 9780511217562
    • contains: 106 tables
    • availability: This ISBN is for an eBook version which is distributed on our behalf by a third party.
  • Table of Contents

    Part I. Equilibrium, efficiency, and asymmetric information:
    1. Asymmetric information
    2. Taxi!
    3. Acid rain
    4. Efficiency
    5. Equilibrium
    6. The prisoner's dilemma game
    7. Repetition and equilibrium
    Part II. Basic Models and Tools:
    8. Maximizing a Quadratic
    9. Overview of calculus
    10. Lagrangian multipliers
    11. The composite commodity model
    12. Quasi-linear preferences
    13. Decision making under uncertainty
    14. Insurance
    Part III. Hidden Action:
    15. Resource allocation
    16. Marketable pollution rights
    17. Incentive regulation of the telecommunications industry
    18. The savings and loan debacle
    19. Personal bankruptcy
    20. Mandatory retirement
    21. Tenure and the performance of professors
    22. Pay and performance in US public schools
    23. Moral hazard and insurance
    Part IV. Corporate Governance:
    24. A brief tour of several countries
    25. Partnerships
    26. The owner-employee relationship
    27. The owner-manager relationship in practice
    28. Agency theory
    Part V. Hidden Characteristics:
    29. Price discrimination
    30. Two-person exchange
    31. The used car market
    32. Credit rationing
    33. Bundling and product quality
    34. Job market signaling
    35. Competitive insurance markets
    Part VI. Auctions:
    36. Introduction
    37. The Vickrey auction
    38. Four basic auction mechanisms
    39. Revenue equivalence
    40. Applications of the revenue equivalence theorem
    41. Interdependent values
    Part VII. Voting and Preference Revelation:
    42. Voting schemes
    43. Preference revelation in general
    44. General proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
    45. The revelation principle
    Part VIII. Public Goods and Preference Revelation:
    46. The economic model
    47. The pivotal mechanism
    48. Groves mechanisms
    49. Efficiency and incentive compatibility
    Part IX. Matching:
    50. Students and advisors
    51. College admissions
    52. Hospitals and doctors
    53. Allocating dormitory rooms
    54. Kidney transplants
    Part X. General Competitive Equilibrium:
    55. Competition, property rights, and prosperity
    56. The Arrow-Debreu economy
    57. Non-convex economies
    58. Efficiency and incentive compatibility
    59. Common property resources.

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    Donald E. Campbell

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  • Author

    Donald E. Campbell, College of William and Mary, Virginia
    Donald E. Campbell is CSX Professor of Economics and Public Policy at William and Mary College, Williamsburg, Virginia, where he has taught since 1990. He previously served as Professor of Economics at the University of Toronto from 1970 to 1990. He is the author of Resource Allocation Mechanisms (Cambridge University Press, 1987), and Equity, Efficiency and Social Choice (1992). His published research has appeared in leading journals such as Econometrica, the Journal of Political Economy, American Economic Review, the Journal of Economic Theory, Review of Economics Studies, and the Journal of Mathematical Economics.

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