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Rules and Reason
Perspectives on Constitutional Political Economy

£56.00

  • Editors:
  • Ram Mudambi, Case Western Reserve University, Ohio and University of Reading
  • Pietro Navarra, Instituto di Chimica e Tecnologia dei Prodotti Naturali (Sezione de Messina), Italy
  • Giuseppe Sobbrio, Instituto di Chimica e Tecnologia dei Prodotti Naturali (Sezione de Messina), Italy
James M. Buchanan, Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra, Giuseppe Sobbrio, Dennis C. Mueller, Viktor Vanberg, Yong J. Yoon, Charles K. Rowley, Nicolaus Tideman, Michael J. Ensley, Michael C. Munger, Bernard N. Grofman, Andrew Reynolds, Pierre Salmon, Chris W. Paul II, Allen W. Wilhite, Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, Olga V. Shvetsova, Bruno S. Frey, Reiner Eichenberger, Francesco Forte, Friedrich Schneider, Alexander Wagner
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  • Date Published: March 2001
  • availability: Available
  • format: Hardback
  • isbn: 9780521650571

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About the Authors
  • Polarization in Western democracies and the collapse of centrally planned economies have led to calls for a redefinition of the state's core functions. This volume explores shifting conceptions of constitutional political economy anchoring the state from the viewpoints of theory, systems, and applications. It suggests why changes may be desirable and how these might be implemented. Part I addresses the writing of constitutions, the dynamic between constitutional order and civil society, the struggle between competitive and protectionist interests, the conflict between protecting expectations and moral evolution, and the role of cultural explanations of constitutional development patterns. Part II explores the interplay between electoral systems and constitutional engineering, the internal costs of political coalitions, and campaigns in pluralistic elections. Part III investigates the quest for stable, dynamic federal states with particular attention to opportunities and pitfalls in Europe. With a foreword and contributions from Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan.

    • State-of-the-art collection on constitutional political economy, hot topic in both economics and political science
    • Authors include world-renowned scholars such as Nobel Laureate James Buchanan, D. Mueller, V. Vanberg, B. Grofman, N. Tideman, C. Rowley, P. Salmon, M. Munger, B. Frey
    • Covers theory, economic and political systems, and applications, especially in North America and Europe
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    Reviews & endorsements

    'Undoubtedly the book is a valuable tool for researchers who strive to deepen their understanding of constitutional political economy. It should also be very useful for policymakers who are currently debating these important constitutional issues in Europe and elsewhere.' Public Choice

    '… a significant scholarly contribution …'. Political Studies Review

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    Product details

    • Date Published: March 2001
    • format: Hardback
    • isbn: 9780521650571
    • length: 336 pages
    • dimensions: 237 x 163 x 23 mm
    • weight: 0.573kg
    • contains: 1 b/w illus. 9 tables
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    Foreword James M. Buchanan
    1. Constitutional issues in modern democracies Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio
    2. On writing a constitution Dennis C. Mueller
    3. Constitutional order and economic evolution: competitive and protectionist interests in democratic societies Viktor Vanberg
    4. The efficacy of arbitrary rules James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon
    5. Constitutional political economy and civil society Charles K. Rowley
    6. The constitutional conflict between protecting expectations and moral evolution Nicolaus Tiseman
    7. Ideological competition and institutions: why cultural explanations of development patterns are not nonsense Michael J. Ensley and Michael C. Munger
    8. Electoral systems and the art of constitutional engineering: an inventory of the main findings Bernard N. Grofman and Andrew Reynolds
    9. Ordinary elections and constitutional arrangements Pierre Salmon
    10. The cost imposed on political coalitions by constituent parties: the case of Italian National Elections Ram Mudambi, Peitro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio
    11. A model of two-party campaigns in pluralistic elections and evidence Chris W. Paul II and Allen W. Wilhite
    12. Ensuring a stable Federal State: economics or political institutional design Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshokk and Olga V. Shevetsova
    13. A proposal for dynamic European Federalism: FOCJ Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger
    14. The Maastricht 'excessive deficit' rules and creative accounting Francesco Forte
    15. Subsidiarity, federalism, and direct democracy as basic elements of a Federal European Constitution Friedrich Schneider and Alexander F. Wagner.

  • Editors

    Ram Mudambi, Case Western Reserve University, Ohio and University of Reading

    Pietro Navarra, Instituto di Chimica e Tecnologia dei Prodotti Naturali (Sezione de Messina), Italy

    Giuseppe Sobbrio, Instituto di Chimica e Tecnologia dei Prodotti Naturali (Sezione de Messina), Italy

    Contributors

    James M. Buchanan, Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra, Giuseppe Sobbrio, Dennis C. Mueller, Viktor Vanberg, Yong J. Yoon, Charles K. Rowley, Nicolaus Tideman, Michael J. Ensley, Michael C. Munger, Bernard N. Grofman, Andrew Reynolds, Pierre Salmon, Chris W. Paul II, Allen W. Wilhite, Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, Olga V. Shvetsova, Bruno S. Frey, Reiner Eichenberger, Francesco Forte, Friedrich Schneider, Alexander Wagner

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