Skip to content
Register Sign in Wishlist
Look Inside Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics

Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics
Proceedings of the Eighth International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics

£47.99

Part of International Symposia in Economic Theory and Econometrics

Hervé Moulin, Norman J. Schofield, Maurice Salles, Ian McLean, Marc Fleurbaey, Peter J. Hammond, William Thomson, William Gehrlein, Bernard Leclerc, Bernard Monjardet, James Redekop, Donald G. Saari, Craig A. Tovey, Beth Allen, Tilman Börgers, Ezra Einy, Bezalel Peleg, Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber, Richard D. McKelvey, Thomas R. Palfrey, William A. Barnett, Thierry Karcher, Patrick Moyes, Alain Trannoy
View all contributors
  • Date Published: April 2006
  • availability: Available
  • format: Paperback
  • isbn: 9780521026215

£ 47.99
Paperback

Add to cart Add to wishlist

Other available formats:
Hardback


Looking for an inspection copy?

This title is not currently available on inspection

Description
Product filter button
Description
Contents
Resources
Courses
About the Authors
  • This book presents an overview of developments in social choice theory and welfare economics, drawn from the proceedings of the eighth conference in the International Symposia in Economic Theory and Econometrics series under the general editorship of William Barnett. The volume is divided into four parts, each exploring broad themes in social choice theory and welfare economics. First, an overview of the short, yet intense, period of the subject's historical development. Second, a discussion of the ethical aspects of social choice, encompassing such issues as equal opportunity, individual rights, and population monotonicity. Third, a study of the algebraic and combinatorial aspects of social choice theory. The final section is devoted to a study of aggregation with risk aversion to current and future variables, and the creation of an intertemporal framework to go beyond the usual static description of income distributions measured over a short period.

    • Investigation of a key area in economic theory
    • Was the first collection to appear drawing on work of the new Social Choice and Welfare Society
    • Well-integrated collection of rigorous analyses from leading North American and European scholars
    Read more

    Customer reviews

    Not yet reviewed

    Be the first to review

    Review was not posted due to profanity

    ×

    , create a review

    (If you're not , sign out)

    Please enter the right captcha value
    Please enter a star rating.
    Your review must be a minimum of 12 words.

    How do you rate this item?

    ×

    Product details

    • Date Published: April 2006
    • format: Paperback
    • isbn: 9780521026215
    • length: 432 pages
    • dimensions: 228 x 151 x 28 mm
    • weight: 0.656kg
    • contains: 28 b/w illus. 27 tables
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    Introduction and overview Hervé Moulin, Maurice Salles and Norman J. Schofield
    Part I. Historical Aspects of Social Choice:
    1. The first golden age of social choice, 1784–1803 Ian McLean
    Part II. Ethical Aspects of Social Choice:
    2. The requisites of equal opportunity Marc Fleurbaey
    3. Social choice of individual and group rights Peter J. Hammond
    4. Population monotonic allocation rules William Thomson
    Part III. Algebraic and Combinatorial Aspects of Social Choice:
    5. Condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity William Gehrlein
    6. Latticial theory of consensus Bernard Leclerc and Bernard Monjardet
    Part IV. Geometric Aspects of Social Choice:
    7. Arrow theorems in economic environments James Redekop
    8. Inner consistency or not inner consistency: a reformulation in the answer Donald G. Saari
    9. Existence of a smooth social function Norman J. Schofield
    10. Dynamical convergence in the Euclidean spatial model Craig A. Tovey
    Part IV. Social Choice and Co-operative Games:
    11. Incentives in market games with asymmetric information Beth Allen
    12. A note on implementation and strong dominance Tilman Börgers
    13. Coalition-proof communication equilibria Ezra Einy and Bezalel Peleg
    14. Stability of coalition structures and the principle of optimal partitioning Michel Le Breton and Shlomo Weber
    15. The hold-out game: an experimental study of an infinitely repeated game with two-sided complete information Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey
    Part IV. Other Applications:
    16. Exact Aggregation under Risk William A. Barnett
    17. The stochastic dominance ordering of income distributions over time: the discounted sum of the expected utilities of incomes Thierry Karcher, Patrick Moyes and Alain Trannoy
    Appendix.

  • Editors

    William A. Barnett, Washington University, St Louis

    Hervé Moulin, Duke University, North Carolina

    Maurice Salles, Université de Caen, France

    Norman J. Schofield, Washington University, St Louis

    Contributors

    Hervé Moulin, Norman J. Schofield, Maurice Salles, Ian McLean, Marc Fleurbaey, Peter J. Hammond, William Thomson, William Gehrlein, Bernard Leclerc, Bernard Monjardet, James Redekop, Donald G. Saari, Craig A. Tovey, Beth Allen, Tilman Börgers, Ezra Einy, Bezalel Peleg, Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber, Richard D. McKelvey, Thomas R. Palfrey, William A. Barnett, Thierry Karcher, Patrick Moyes, Alain Trannoy

Sign In

Please sign in to access your account

Cancel

Not already registered? Create an account now. ×

Sorry, this resource is locked

Please register or sign in to request access. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email lecturers@cambridge.org

Register Sign in
Please note that this file is password protected. You will be asked to input your password on the next screen.

» Proceed

You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website. Your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner www.ebooks.com. Please see the permission section of the www.ebooks.com catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.

Continue ×

Continue ×

Continue ×

Find content that relates to you

Join us online

This site uses cookies to improve your experience. Read more Close

Are you sure you want to delete your account?

This cannot be undone.

Cancel

Thank you for your feedback which will help us improve our service.

If you requested a response, we will make sure to get back to you shortly.

×
Please fill in the required fields in your feedback submission.
×