Algorithmic Game Theory
- Noam Nisan, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
- Tim Roughgarden, Stanford University, California
- Eva Tardos, Cornell University, New York
- Vijay V. Vazirani, Georgia Institute of Technology
In recent years game theory has had a substantial impact on computer science, especially on Internet- and e-commerce-related issues. Algorithmic Game Theory, first published in 2007, develops the central ideas and results of this exciting area in a clear and succinct manner. More than 40 of the top researchers in this field have written chapters that go from the foundations to the state of the art. Basic chapters on algorithmic methods for equilibria, mechanism design and combinatorial auctions are followed by chapters on important game theory applications such as incentives and pricing, cost sharing, information markets and cryptography and security. This definitive work will set the tone of research for the next few years and beyond. Students, researchers, and practitioners alike need to learn more about these fascinating theoretical developments and their widespread practical application.Read more
- First book to cover the whole spectrum of algorithmic game theory
- Contributions by all the major researchers in the field
- Applied chapters by researchers and consultants at major firms such as Yahoo, Lehman Brothers, IBM and Microsoft
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'… a tome to be dipped into by researchers and developers who would want to know more about certain aspects of the field and particular 'state-of-the-art' issues and applications.' Kybernetes
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- Date Published: December 2007
- format: Adobe eBook Reader
- isbn: 9780511352942
- contains: 36 b/w illus.
- availability: This ISBN is for an eBook version which is distributed on our behalf by a third party.
Table of Contents
Introduction Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Éva Tardos and Vijay V. Vazirani
Part I. Computing in Games:
1. Basic solution concepts and computational issues Éva Tardos and Vijay V. Vazirani
2. Algorithms for equilibria Christos Papadimitriou
3. Equilibrium computation for games in strategic and extensive form Bernhard von Stengel
4. Learning, regret minimization and correlated equilibria Avrim Blum and Yishay Mansour
5. Graphical games Michael J. Kearns
6. Cryptography and game theory Yevgeniy Dodis and Tal Rabin
7. Combinatorial algorithms for market equilibria Vijay V. Vazirani
8. Computation of market equilibria by convex programming Bruno Codenotti and Kasturi Varadarajan
Part II. Algorithmic Mechanism Design:
9. Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists) Noam Nisan
10. Mechanism design without money James Schummer and Rakesh V. Vohra
11. Combinatorial auctions Noam Nisan and Liad Blumrosen
12. Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms Ron Lavi
13. Profit maximization in mechanism design Jason Hartline and Anna Karlin
14. Distributed algorithmic mechanism design Joan Feigenbaum, Michael Schapira and Scott Shenker
15. Cost sharing Kamal Jain and Mohammad Mahdian
16. On-line mechanisms David C. Parkes
Part III. Quantifying the Inefficiency of Equilibria:
17. Introduction to the inefficiency of equilibria Tim Roughgarden and Éva Tardos
18. Routing games Tim Roughgarden
19. Inefficiency of equilibria in network formation games Éva Tardos and Tom Wexler
20. Selfish load-balancing Berthold Vöcking
21. Efficiency loss and the design of scalable resource allocation mechanisms Ramesh Johari
Part IV. Additional Topics:
22. Incentives and pricing in communication networks Asuman Ozdaglar and R. Srikant
23. Incentives in peer-to-peer systems John Chuang, Michal Feldman and Moshe Babaioff
24. Cascading behavior in networks: algorithmic and economic issues Jon Kleinberg
25. Incentives and information security Ross Anderson, Tyler Moore, Shishir Nagaraja and Andy Ozment
26. Computational aspects of information markets David M. Pennock and Rahul Sami
27. Manipulation-resistant reputation systems Eric Friedman, Paul Resnick and Rahul Sami
28. Sponsored search auctions Sebastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock, Amin Saberi and Rakesh V. Vohra
29. Algorithmic issues in evolutionary game theory Michael Kearns and Siddharth Suri.
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