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Hybrid Regimes within Democracies
Fiscal Federalism and Subnational Rentier States

£75.00

  • Date Published: January 2019
  • availability: In stock
  • format: Hardback
  • isbn: 9781316510735

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  • From the racially segregated 'Jim Crow' US South to the many electoral but hardly democratic local regimes in Argentina and other federal democracies, the political rights of citizens around the world are often curtailed by powerful subnational rulers. Hybrid Regimes within Democracies presents the first comprehensive study of democracy and authoritarianism in all the subnational units of a federation. The book focuses on Argentina, but also contains a comparative chapter that considers seven other federations including Germany, Mexico, and the United States. The in-depth and multidimensional description of subnational regimes in all Argentine provinces is complemented with an innovative explanation for the large differences between those that are democratic and those that are 'hybrid' - complex combinations of democratic and authoritarian elements. Putting forward and testing an original theory of subnational democracy, Gervasoni extends the rentier-state explanatory logic from resource rents to the more general concept of 'fiscal rents', including 'fiscal federalism rents', and from the national to the subnational level.

    • Presents the first in-depth descriptive and explanatory study of democracy and authoritarianism in all the subnational units of a federation
    • Develops two original strategies to measure subnational regimes
    • Extends the rentier-state explanatory logic to other sources of state revenue such as federal transfers to subnational governments
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    Reviews & endorsements

    'Carlos Gervasoni's Hybrid Regimes within Democracies: Fiscal Federalism and Subnational Rentier States is an outstanding contribution to the literatures on democracy, hybrid regimes, subnational politics, fiscal federalism, and rentier states. It is theoretically innovative and important and empirically rich.' Scott Mainwaring, Harvard University, Massachusetts

    'How do authoritarian populists emerge in democracies? Gervasoni's compelling answer is that they often arise in regions that depend on transfers from the federal government, which can be treated like rents. In Argentina, these rents fueled patronage systems that undermined democratic constraints and funded repression. This book suggests that the theory of rentier states – which explains how oil rents can undercut democratic pressures at the national level – can be applied more broadly to other kinds of rents, and to subnational governments. Hybrid Regimes within Democracies significantly deepens our understanding of democracy at the subnational level, the rise of authoritarian populism, and fiscal federalism.' Michael L. Ross, University of California, Los Angeles

    'The notion that subnational units vary in the quality and practice of politics is part and parcel of a broader disciplinary move toward explaining ever more local phenomenon. Gervasoni's represents the very best of this booming area of research. He combines a broad theoretical orientation with the detailed knowledge and original data of a top-notch country specialist. Thanks to his efforts, we have a richer understanding of how democracy does (and does not) flourish across decentralized governments.' Erik Wibbels, Duke University, North Carolina

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    Product details

    • Date Published: January 2019
    • format: Hardback
    • isbn: 9781316510735
    • length: 308 pages
    • dimensions: 235 x 157 x 20 mm
    • weight: 0.54kg
    • contains: 28 b/w illus. 30 tables
    • availability: In stock
  • Table of Contents

    Part I. Description: The Anatomy and Evolution of Subnational Regimes:
    1. Defining and measuring subnational regimes
    2. The subnational democracy index: trends in provincial regimes (1983–2015)
    3. Expert survey evidence: the many dimensions of subnational democracy
    Part II. Explanation: The Causes of Subnational Regimes:
    4. On the rentier effects of fiscal federalism on subnational regimes
    5. Fiscal federalism, subnational rentierism, and hybrid provincial regimes in Argentina
    6. The determinants of provincial regimes in Argentina
    Part III. Comparison: Subnational Regimes around the World: A Comparative Perspective: Levels of subnational democracy in seven federations and one unitary country
    Conclusion.

  • Author

    Carlos Gervasoni, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
    Carlos Gervasoni is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Studies at the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires, Argentina. His articles have appeared in journals such as Comparative Political Studies, Democratization, Party Politics, Política y Gobierno, and World Politics. He is a Regional Manager for the Varieties of Democracy project, and a member of the 2015 Argentine Panel Election Study research team. His research on subnational regimes has been supported by a National Science Foundation award.

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