Skip to content
Register Sign in Wishlist

Knowledge, Dexterity, and Attention
A Theory of Epistemic Agency

£18.99

  • Date Published: January 2019
  • availability: Available
  • format: Paperback
  • isbn: 9781107461574

£ 18.99
Paperback

Add to cart Add to wishlist

Other available formats:
Hardback, eBook


Looking for an inspection copy?

This title is not currently available on inspection

Description
Product filter button
Description
Contents
Resources
Courses
About the Authors
  • Contemporary cognitive science clearly tells us that attention is modulated for speech and action. While these forms of goal-directed attention are very well researched in psychology, they have not been sufficiently studied by epistemologists. In this book, Abrol Fairweather and Carlos Montemayor develop and defend a theory of epistemic achievements that requires the manifestation of cognitive agency. They examine empirical work on the psychology of attention and assertion, and use it to ground a normative theory of epistemic achievements and virtues. The resulting study is the first sustained, naturalized virtue epistemology, and will be of interest to readers in epistemology, cognitive science, and beyond.

    • Readers in both psychology and philosophy will benefit from an original and interdisciplinary explanation of the psychology of epistemic motivation
    • Offers a historical assessment of previous attempts at providing a motivation-based approach to epistemic achievements within a reliabilist framework, contributing to key debates on the relation between ability, motivation, and credit
    • Presents new ideas on the psychology of curiosity and its relation to linguistic motivations, particularly assertion
    Read more

    Reviews & endorsements

    'This is an excellent book … The reader gets a balanced, critical account of how virtue epistemology stands today. The argumentation is judicious and insightful. I learned a great deal from it, and so, I think, will anybody who reads it.' Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

    Customer reviews

    Not yet reviewed

    Be the first to review

    Review was not posted due to profanity

    ×

    , create a review

    (If you're not , sign out)

    Please enter the right captcha value
    Please enter a star rating.
    Your review must be a minimum of 12 words.

    How do you rate this item?

    ×

    Product details

    • Date Published: January 2019
    • format: Paperback
    • isbn: 9781107461574
    • dimensions: 230 x 150 x 10 mm
    • weight: 0.3kg
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    Introduction: why only agents are knowers
    1. Epistemic virtue, reliable attention and cognitive constitution
    2. Meta-epistemology and epistemic agency
    3. Success semantics and the etiology of success
    4. Epistemic agency
    5. Assertion as epistemic motivation
    6. Curiosity and epistemic achievement
    7. Collective agency, assertion and information.

  • Authors

    Abrol Fairweather, San Francisco State University
    Abrol Fairweather is Lecturer in Philosophy at San Francisco State University. He has edited several volumes on virtue epistemology, including Virtue Epistemology (with Linda Zagzebski, 2001), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue (with Own Flanagan, 2014), and Epistemic Situationism (with Mark Alfano, 2017).

    Carlos Montemayor, San Francisco State University
    Carlos Montemayor is Associate Professor of Philosophy at San Francisco State University. He is the author of Minding Time: A Philosophical and Theoretical Approach to the Psychology of Time (2013) and Consciousness, Attention, and Conscious Attention (with H. H. Haladjian, 2015).

Sign In

Please sign in to access your account

Cancel

Not already registered? Create an account now. ×

Sorry, this resource is locked

Please register or sign in to request access. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email lecturers@cambridge.org

Register Sign in
Please note that this file is password protected. You will be asked to input your password on the next screen.

» Proceed

You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website. Your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner www.ebooks.com. Please see the permission section of the www.ebooks.com catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.

Continue ×

Continue ×

Continue ×

Find content that relates to you

Join us online

This site uses cookies to improve your experience. Read more Close

Are you sure you want to delete your account?

This cannot be undone.

Cancel

Thank you for your feedback which will help us improve our service.

If you requested a response, we will make sure to get back to you shortly.

×
Please fill in the required fields in your feedback submission.
×