Skip to content
Register Sign in Wishlist

Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for Dualism

£57.00

Part of Cambridge Studies in Philosophy

  • Date Published: October 2013
  • availability: In stock
  • format: Hardback
  • isbn: 9781107037878

£ 57.00
Hardback

Add to cart Add to wishlist

Other available formats:
Paperback, eBook


Looking for an inspection copy?

This title is not currently available on inspection

Description
Product filter button
Description
Contents
Resources
Courses
About the Authors
  • The relationship between mind and matter, mental states and physical states, has occupied the attention of philosophers for thousands of years. Richard Fumerton's primary concern is the knowledge argument for dualism - an argument that proceeds from the idea that we can know truths about our existence and our mental states without knowing any truths about the physical world. This view has come under relentless criticism, but here Fumerton makes a powerful case for its rehabilitation, demonstrating clearly the importance of its interconnections with a wide range of other controversies within philosophy. Fumerton analyzes philosophical views about the nature of thought and the relation of those views to arguments for dualism, and investigates the connection between a traditional form of foundationalism about knowledge, and a foundationalist view about thought that underlies traditional arguments for dualism. His book will be of great interest to those studying epistemology and the philosophy of mind.

    • Explores the fundamental epistemological presuppositions of arguments for property dualism
    • Emphasizes a common foundationalist structure to both knowledge and thought
    • Provides readers with connections between different philosophical disciplines
    Read more

    Customer reviews

    Not yet reviewed

    Be the first to review

    Review was not posted due to profanity

    ×

    , create a review

    (If you're not , sign out)

    Please enter the right captcha value
    Please enter a star rating.
    Your review must be a minimum of 12 words.

    How do you rate this item?

    ×

    Product details

    • Date Published: October 2013
    • format: Hardback
    • isbn: 9781107037878
    • length: 295 pages
    • dimensions: 222 x 145 x 24 mm
    • weight: 0.51kg
    • availability: In stock
  • Table of Contents

    Preface
    1. Setting the stage
    2. Distinctions - versions of physicalism and dualism
    3. Ontological priorities - taking phenomenology seriously
    4. Knowledge arguments revisited
    5. Indirect thought and informative identity
    6. An ontologically liberating skepticism - the last hope for physicalism
    7. Objections and replies
    8. The ubiquitous self - a brief postscript.

  • Author

    Richard Fumerton, University of Iowa
    Richard Fumerton is the F. Wendell Miller Professor of Philosophy at the University of Iowa. His most recent publications include Realism and the Correspondence Theory of Truth (2002), Epistemology (2006) and The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill (with Wendy Donner, 2009).

Sign In

Please sign in to access your account

Cancel

Not already registered? Create an account now. ×

Sorry, this resource is locked

Please register or sign in to request access. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email lecturers@cambridge.org

Register Sign in
Please note that this file is password protected. You will be asked to input your password on the next screen.

» Proceed

You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website. Your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner www.ebooks.com. Please see the permission section of the www.ebooks.com catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.

Continue ×

Continue ×

Continue ×

Find content that relates to you

Join us online

This site uses cookies to improve your experience. Read more Close

Are you sure you want to delete your account?

This cannot be undone.

Cancel

Thank you for your feedback which will help us improve our service.

If you requested a response, we will make sure to get back to you shortly.

×
Please fill in the required fields in your feedback submission.
×