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Antitrust Law
Economic Theory and Common Law Evolution

£68.00

  • Date Published: March 2003
  • availability: Available
  • format: Hardback
  • isbn: 9780521790314

£ 68.00
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About the Authors
  • This book is an effort to consolidate several different perspectives on antitrust law. First, Professor Hylton presents a detailed description of the law as it has developed through numerous judicial opinions. Second, the author presents detailed economic critiques of the judicial opinions, drawing heavily on the literature in law and economics journals. Third, Professor Hylton integrates a jurisprudential perspective into the analysis that looks at antitrust as a vibrant field of common law. This last perspective leads the author to address issues of certainty, stability, and predictability in antitrust law, and to examine the pressures shaping its evolution. The combination of these three perspectives offers something new to every student of antitrust law. Specific topics covered include perfect competition versus monopoly, enforcement, cartels, section 1 doctrine, rule of reason, agreement, boycott, power, vertical restraints, tying and exclusive dealing, horizontal mergers, and conglomerates.

    • Most up-to-date text on US antitrust law for law students and economics graduate students
    • Book's orientation is comprehensive in its coverage of topics; contains very little mathematics
    • Professionals interested in law and economics will find this a useful resource; fills a real gap in the legal classroom
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    Reviews & endorsements

    '… this book is, quite simply, the best I have ever encountered to deal with US law. It is, in a nutshell, superb, and I wish it had been published six months ago.' European Competition Law Review

    'This book is the single best one-volume discussion of modern antitrust law available. It is encyclopaedic in coverage, but deeper than a treatise because it is informed at every step with the best and most systematic of current economic and legal analysis. If you want to learn (or to learn more) about modern antitrust law, read this book.' George Priest, Yale Law School

    'An excellent treatment of antitrust law. It should appeal to audiences in economics as well as law. The economic analysis will enable lawyers to understand and address all of the policy options, and to be able to analyze antitrust issues more completely and more persuasively. Keith Hylton is a well-known and respected scholar in this field.' Joel P. Trachtman, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

    'Hylton's text provides an excellent account of antitrust and common law evolution. He extracts the essence of the landmark antitrust decisions to demonstrate their legal evolution in a very efficient way. His use of economics is not only appropriate to the subject matter; it is also appropriate for student readership in law and economics. The writing is clear and concise.' Roger D. Blair, University of Florida

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    Product details

    • Date Published: March 2003
    • format: Hardback
    • isbn: 9780521790314
    • length: 430 pages
    • dimensions: 229 x 152 x 29 mm
    • weight: 0.8kg
    • contains: 14 b/w illus.
    • availability: Available
  • Table of Contents

    Part I. Economics:
    1. Definitions
    2. Perfect competition versus monopoly
    3. Further topics
    Part II. Law and Policy:
    4. Some interpretations issues
    5. Enacting the antitrust law
    6. What should antitrust law aim to do?
    Part III. Enforcement:
    7. Optimal enforcement theory
    8. Enforcement provision of the antitrust laws
    Appendix
    Part IV. Cartels:
    9. Cartels
    10. Conscious parallelism
    11. Conclusion
    Part V. Development of Section 1 Doctrine:
    12. The Sherman act versus the common law
    13. Rule of reason and per se rule
    14. Conclusion
    Part VI. Rule of Reason and Per Se Rule:
    14. The case for price-fixing
    15. Per se and rule of reason analysis: further developments
    16. Per se versus rule of reason tests: understanding the Supreme Court's justification for the per se rule
    Part VII. Agreement:
    17. The development of inference doctrine
    18. Rejection of unilateral contract theory
    Part VIII. Facilitating Mechanisms:
    19. Data dissemination cases
    20. Basing point pricing and related practices
    21. Basing point pricing: economics
    Part IV. Boycotts:
    22. Pre-Socony
    23. Post-Socony
    24. Post-BMI/Sylvania
    25. Conclusion
    Part X. Monopolization:
    26. Development of section 2 doctrine
    27. Leveraging and essential facility cases
    28. Predatory pricing
    29. Conclusion
    Part XI. Power:
    30. Measuring market power
    31. Determinants of market power
    32. Substitutability and the relevant market: cellophane
    33. Multi-market monopoly and the relevant market: Alcoa
    34. Measuring power: guidelines
    Part XII. Attempts:
    35. The Swift formula and modern doctrine
    36. Dangerous probability requirement
    Part XIII. Vertical Restraints:
    37. Resale price maintenance
    38. Vertical non-price restraints
    39. Manufacturer retains title
    40. Agreement
    Part XIV. Tying and Exclusive Dealing:
    41. Introduction
    42. Early cases
    43. Development of the per se rule
    44. Tension between rule of reason arguments and per se rule
    45. Technological tying
    46. Exclusive dealing
    Appendix
    47. Horizontal Mergers:
    48. Reasons for merging and implications for law
    49. Horizontal merger law
    50. Conclusion
    Appendix
    Part XV. Mergers, Vertical and Conglomerate:
    51. Vertical mergers
    52. Conglomerate mergers
    53. Concluding remarks
    Part XVI. Antitrust and the state:
    54. Noerr-Pennington doctrine
    55. Parker doctrine.

  • Author

    Keith N. Hylton, Boston University
    Keith N. Hylton has taught at the School of Law of Boston University since 1995. He previously served on the faculty and was tenured at Northwestern University School of Law. Professor Hylton currently teaches courses in antitrust, torts, and labor law, and writes widely in the field of law and economics, with more than forty publications in American law journals and peer-reviewed law and economics journals. He has served as a Director of the American Law and Economics Association.

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