Other available formats:
Looking for an examination copy?
This title is not currently available for examination. However, if you are interested in the title for your course we can consider offering an examination copy. To register your interest please contact email@example.com providing details of the course you are teaching.
Can nuclear agreements like the Iran deal work? This book develops formal bargaining models to show that they can over time, despite apparent incentives to cheat. Existing theories of nuclear proliferation fail to account for the impact of bargaining on the process. William Spaniel explores how credible agreements exist in which rival states make concessions to convince rising states not to proliferate and argues in support of nuclear negotiations as effective counter-proliferation tools. This book proves not only the existence of settlements but also the robustness of the inefficiency puzzle. In addition to examining existing agreements, the model used by Spaniel serves as a baseline for modeling other concerns about nuclear weapons.Read more
- Develops new framework of nuclear negotiations that will be useful for readers to develop new theories for nuclear proliferation
- Includes multiple long-form case studies which speak to substantive historical debates as well as general theoretical issues
- Weaves together formal, quantitative, and qualitative analysis and can be used as an assigned reading to demonstrate the utility of mixed-methods approaches
Not yet reviewed
Be the first to review
Review was not posted due to profanity×
- Date Published: April 2019
- format: Hardback
- isbn: 9781108477055
- length: 224 pages
- dimensions: 235 x 156 x 18 mm
- weight: 0.46kg
- contains: 13 b/w illus. 6 tables
- availability: In stock
Table of Contents
1. How are nuclear weapons special? 2. The theory of butter-for-bombs agreements: how potential power coerces concessions
3. Does nuclear proficiency induce compliance? 4. The diplomacy of butter-for-bombs agreements
5. Arms treaties and the changing credibility of preventive war
6. You get what you give: endogenous nuclear reversal
7. Preventive strikes: when states call the wrong 'bluff'
8. Lessons learned.
Sorry, this resource is locked