Skip to content
Register Sign in Wishlist
Look Inside Bargaining over the Bomb

Bargaining over the Bomb
The Successes and Failures of Nuclear Negotiations

$99.99 (P)

  • Date Published: April 2019
  • availability: In stock
  • format: Hardback
  • isbn: 9781108477055

$ 99.99 (P)
Hardback

Add to cart Add to wishlist

Other available formats:
Paperback


Looking for an examination copy?

This title is not currently available for examination. However, if you are interested in the title for your course we can consider offering an examination copy. To register your interest please contact collegesales@cambridge.org providing details of the course you are teaching.

Description
Product filter button
Description
Contents
Resources
Courses
About the Authors
  • Can nuclear agreements like the Iran deal work? This book develops formal bargaining models to show that they can over time, despite apparent incentives to cheat. Existing theories of nuclear proliferation fail to account for the impact of bargaining on the process. William Spaniel explores how credible agreements exist in which rival states make concessions to convince rising states not to proliferate and argues in support of nuclear negotiations as effective counter-proliferation tools. This book proves not only the existence of settlements but also the robustness of the inefficiency puzzle. In addition to examining existing agreements, the model used by Spaniel serves as a baseline for modeling other concerns about nuclear weapons.

    • Develops new framework of nuclear negotiations that will be useful for readers to develop new theories for nuclear proliferation
    • Includes multiple long-form case studies which speak to substantive historical debates as well as general theoretical issues
    • Weaves together formal, quantitative, and qualitative analysis and can be used as an assigned reading to demonstrate the utility of mixed-methods approaches
    Read more

    Customer reviews

    Not yet reviewed

    Be the first to review

    Review was not posted due to profanity

    ×

    , create a review

    (If you're not , sign out)

    Please enter the right captcha value
    Please enter a star rating.
    Your review must be a minimum of 12 words.

    How do you rate this item?

    ×

    Product details

    • Date Published: April 2019
    • format: Hardback
    • isbn: 9781108477055
    • length: 224 pages
    • dimensions: 235 x 156 x 18 mm
    • weight: 0.46kg
    • contains: 13 b/w illus. 6 tables
    • availability: In stock
  • Table of Contents

    Introduction
    1. How are nuclear weapons special? 2. The theory of butter-for-bombs agreements: how potential power coerces concessions
    3. Does nuclear proficiency induce compliance? 4. The diplomacy of butter-for-bombs agreements
    5. Arms treaties and the changing credibility of preventive war
    6. You get what you give: endogenous nuclear reversal
    7. Preventive strikes: when states call the wrong 'bluff'
    8. Lessons learned.

  • Author

    William Spaniel, University of Pittsburgh
    William Spaniel is an Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh. He previously served as a Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. He is also the author of Game Theory 101: The Complete Textbook (2011).

Sign In

Please sign in to access your account

Cancel

Not already registered? Create an account now. ×

Sorry, this resource is locked

Please register or sign in to request access. If you are having problems accessing these resources please email lecturers@cambridge.org

Register Sign in
Please note that this file is password protected. You will be asked to input your password on the next screen.

» Proceed

You are now leaving the Cambridge University Press website. Your eBook purchase and download will be completed by our partner www.ebooks.com. Please see the permission section of the www.ebooks.com catalogue page for details of the print & copy limits on our eBooks.

Continue ×

Continue ×

Continue ×

Find content that relates to you

Join us online

This site uses cookies to improve your experience. Read more Close

Are you sure you want to delete your account?

This cannot be undone.

Cancel

Thank you for your feedback which will help us improve our service.

If you requested a response, we will make sure to get back to you shortly.

×
Please fill in the required fields in your feedback submission.
×