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Look Inside A Theory of Legal Obligation

A Theory of Legal Obligation


  • Publication planned for: September 2019
  • availability: Not yet published - available from September 2019
  • format: Hardback
  • isbn: 9781108475105

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About the Authors
  • The focus of this monograph lies in the construction of a theory of legal obligation, understanding it as a discrete notion with its own defining traits. In this work, Bertea specifically addresses the question: how should legal obligation be distinctively conceptualized? The conceptualization of legal obligation he defends in this work gradually emerges from a critical assessment of the theories of legal obligation that have been most influential in the contemporary legal-theoretical debate. Building on such critical analysis, Bertea's study purports to offer a novel and unconventional conceptualization of legal obligation, which is characterized as a law-engendered intersubjective reason for carrying out certain courses of conduct.

    • Questions how should legal obligation be distinctively conceptualized and defends a comprehensive and original theory of legal obligation
    • Critically assesses the most influential theoretical existing models and presents a new, alternative concept of legal obligation
    • Explores a unique methodology of inquiry that has not been used in jurisprudence before and is not reducible to any of the traditional methods employed
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    Product details

    • Publication planned for: September 2019
    • format: Hardback
    • isbn: 9781108475105
    • dimensions: 228 x 152 mm
    • availability: Not yet published - available from September 2019
  • Table of Contents

    1. The concept of obligation
    2. Contemporary approaches to legal obligations: a preliminary map
    3. The social-practice account
    4. The interpretivist account
    5. The conventionalist reason account
    6. The exclusionary reason account
    7. A revisionary Kantian conception
    8. Further dimensions of the revisionary Kantian conception
    9. The robust reason account
    10. The method of presuppositional interpretation

  • Author

    Stefano Bertea, University of Leicester
    Stefano Bertea is a Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft research fellow at the Goethe Universität and an Associate Professor at the University of Leicester. Previously, he was a Marie Skłodowska-Curie research fellow at the University of Edinburgh and at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, a visiting research fellow at the Am Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Germany, an Alexander von Humboldt research fellow at the Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, a senior research fellow at the Universiteit Antwerpen, a visiting professor at the Università degli Studi di Verona and at the Università degli Studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia, and a visiting researcher at the Universiteit van Amsterdam.

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